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This research examines the association between political connections and related party 
transactions (RPTs). This study also investigates whether politically-connected firms 
use RPTs to tunnel resources and mask “true” operating performance by managing 
earnings. This study is motivated by conflicting views on whether political connections 
are beneficial or detrimental to stakeholder interests. In addition, this research 
investigates how political connections, in concert with RPTs, determine auditor choice 
in Indonesia. This auditor choice aspect of the study is motivated by the conflicting 
views and inconclusive findings on whether politically-connected firms will appoint 
reputable auditors, i.e., the Big 4 audit firms, or non-Big 4 auditors. 
Essay one examines the relationship between political connections and RPTs 
and investigates whether firms with political connections engage more or less in RPTs. 
It hypothesizes that politically connected firms conduct more value-destroying RPTs 
compared to non-politically connected firms, because they have more power and 
opportunities gained from their connections. The findings of essay one reveal that 
politically connected firms conduct more RPTs compared to non-politically connected 
firms. In terms of economic significance, the reported coefficient suggests that, 
compared to non-connected firms, politically connected firms carry out 43% more 
RPTs. However, the regression results show that the significant influence of political 
connections applies only to RPTLOAN (RPT loans and guarantees). In order to capture 
the richness in political dynamism in Indonesia, a finer classification of political 
connections is utilized where connected firms can be classified further into government, 
military, and Suharto connections. Using this approach, the study reveals that only the 
coefficient of GCON (government connection) is positive and significant, suggesting 
that listed firms having political connections with the Government will conduct more 
RPTLOANs. The insignificant influence of Suharto and military connections occurs 
because, after Suharto’s resignation, firms associated with Suharto and military 
personnel had difficulties in establishing a connection with the new government, and 
experienced loss of government contracts, distributorships, and brokerage monopolies.  
Essay two investigates whether politically connected firms use RPTs to tunnel 
resources, and to mask “true” operating performance by managing earnings. This essay 
argues that politically connected firms have incentives to conduct more tunnelling 
compared to non-politically connected firms, due to the costs of establishment and 
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maintenance of political connections, the opportunity to seize the benefits brought by 
political connections, and fewer disciplinary constraints from laws and regulations. 
Such tunnelling activities cause the economic performance of politically connected 
firms to deteriorate and, as a result, they need to be concealed by conducting income-
increasing earnings management. Essay two provides empirical evidence that politically 
connected firms use RPTs to tunnel resources, and to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management designed to mask tunnelling activities. 
Essay three investigates how political connections determine auditor choice in 
Indonesia. This essay proposes that, because of tunnelling incentives, firms having 
political connections with the government might appoint non-big four auditors in order 
to allow them to have less transparent financial statements and to obfuscate their 
tunnelling activities. On the other hand, following the collapse of the Suharto regime, 
privileges and benefits enjoyed by firms having connections with Suharto and the 
military have gone, so that they have less incentive to engage in tunnelling and financial 
report manipulation in order to obfuscate such tunnelling. Therefore, essay three 
proposes that firms having connections with Suharto and the military are more likely to 
hire the Big 4 auditors. The results of essay three document that politically connected 
firms in Indonesia tend to choose non-Big 4 auditors. When a finer classification of 
political connections is used the regression results show that firms having connections 
with the government are more inclined to choose non-Big 4 auditors, whereas those 
with connections to Suharto have the option to appoint Big 4 auditors.Further, essay 
three also proposes that since RPTs involving loans allow politically connected firms to 
siphon resources, there is an incentive for those firms to manipulate financial reports in 
order to obfuscate “true” economic performance. Thus, politically connected firms with 
RPT loans are more likely to choose non-Big 4 auditors. Essay three documents that 
RPTs have a significant influence on the appointment of auditors of politically 
connected firms. The tendency to appoint non-Big 4 auditors increases when firms have 
political affiliations with the government and carry out RPTs. 
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